by skyhook77sfg » Mon May 16, 2011 3:49 pm
LATEST U.S G. THINKING
"The joint force should develop frameworks and mechanisms with academia, business and industry, NGOs and other USG agencies to enable the identification and analysis of the appropriate leading indicators that measure the effectiveness of developmental, governance, and security activities in an IW environment.
Special operations elements will require enabling combat support as they work in more remote locations or politically sensitive missions. In general, countering irregular threats will require distributed, small-unit operations and scalable, tailorable, integrated military-civilian teams with a mix of mutually supporting SOF and GPF. Distributed operations on a global scale place great stress on enablers' capacity for providing mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote logistics, engineering planners, construction, intelligence, regional specialists, human terrain teams, interpreters/translators, communications, dog teams, close air support specialists, security forces, and base operating support.
There are principally five activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a coherent campaign to address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO). In addition to these five core activities, there are a host of key related activities including strategic communications, information operations of all kinds, psychological operations, civil-military operations, and support to law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations in which the joint force may engage to counter irregular threats.
In order to maximize the prospect of success, the joint force must understand the population and operating environment, including the complex historical, political, socio-cultural, religious, economic and other causes of violent conflict. The joint force must adopt collaborative frameworks to understand, plan, act, assess, and adapt in concert with U.S. Government (USG) interagency and multinational partners and the host nation. Adequate frameworks for such collaboration do not currently exist in any codified or institutionalized form, although a variety of ad hoc mechanisms have been used and various studies have proposed such frameworks
."
ad hoc is classic way to say
we're still wingin it
kentucky windage
seat of pants
kindathing.
but things are looking up.
Abbottabad was a wendepunkt(for azari)
tipping point to others....
no more hands tied hand wringing.
obama trumps Cheney/Bush tough talk
with tough call and bold move
as commander in chief.
Tough guy posturing by darkside dick
and connecticut cowboy cheerleader failed.
Competent refocus on mission by Barack Hussein succeeds.
Col Maxwell says:
The bottom line is that USSOCOM “experiment,” while perhaps not perfect, has served our nation and its strategic interests well and has demonstrated that SOF have ade significant contributions and achieved significant effects as part of the joint and interagency team.
When closely examined, the “SEAL operation” against Bin Laden will be touted as the most successful joint special operation in recent history... a joint and interagency operation and not a SOF unilateral one.
Colonel David S. Maxwell, US Army Special Forces is a member of the military faculty at the
National War College of the National Defense University. He has nearly 30 years’ experience in
the Infantry and Special Forces, with more than 25 years of service in Asia. He is a graduate of