The Afghanistan Thread

[cincinnatus]

Maybe I need to pick up drinking...when I can't disagree with ALI, it's over. I wish I had a "smiley" showing uncontrolled retching. It's about the only thing close.

Absolutely horrible what those "men" did to those victims. They not only killed many innocents wantonly (and perversely), but will now have the blood of fellow soldiers, marines, airmen and sailors on their hands when the violent repercussions are felt.

But, thankfully the royal family is enjoying their Spring Break.

[AzariLoveIran]

[AzariLoveIran]

.

image-194584-galleryV9-ghyz.jpg (169.03 KiB) Viewed 885 times

This image shows the body of Gul Mudin, the son of a farmer, who was killed on Jan. 15, 2010. A member of the "kill team" is posing behind him. SPIEGEL published just three photos out of the some 4,000 images and videos it has seen.


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[skyhook77sfg]

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:



An Open Letter to President Obama

Mr. President,
We have been engaged and working inside Afghanistan, some of us for decades, as academics, experts and members of non-governmental organizations. Today we are deeply worried about the current course of the war and the lack of credible scenarios for the future. The cost of the war is now over $120 billion per year for the United States alone. This is unsustainable in the long run. In addition, human losses are increasing. Over 680 soldiers from the international coalition – along with hundreds of Afghans – have died this year in Afghanistan, and the year is not yet over. We appeal to you to use the unparalleled resources and influence which the United States now brings to bear in Afghanistan to achieve that longed-for peace.
Despite these huge costs, the situation on the ground is much worse than a year ago because the Taliban insurgency has made progress across the country. It is now very difficult to work outside the cities or even move around Afghanistan by road. The insurgents have built momentum, exploiting the shortcomings of the Afghan government and the mistakes of the coalition. The Taliban today are now a national movement with a serious presence in the north and the west of the country. Foreign bases are completely isolated from their local environment and unable to protect the population. Foreign forces have by now been in Afghanistan longer than the Soviet Red Army.
Politically, the settlement resulting from the 2001 intervention is unsustainable because the constituencies of whom the Taliban are the most violent expression are not represented, and because the highly centralized constitution goes against the grain of Afghan tradition, for example in specifying national elections in fourteen of the next twenty years.
The operations in the south of Afghanistan, in Kandahar and in Helmand provinces are not going well. What was supposed to be a population-centred strategy is now a full-scale military campaign causing civilian casualties and destruction of property. Night raids have become the main weapon to eliminate suspected Taliban, but much of the Afghan population sees these methods as illegitimate. Due to the violence of the military operations, we are losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Pashtun countryside, with a direct effect on the sustainability of the war. These measures, beyond their debatable military results, foster grievance. With Pakistan’s active support for the Taliban, it is not realistic to bet on a military solution. Drone strikes in Pakistan have a marginal effect on the insurgency but are destabilizing Pakistan. The losses of the insurgency are compensated by new recruits who are often more radical than their predecessors.
The military campaign is suppressing, locally and temporarily, the symptoms of the disease, but fails to offer a cure. Military action may produce local and temporary improvements in security, but those improvements are neither going to last nor be replicable in the vast areas not garrisoned by Western forces without a political settlement.
The 2014 deadline to put the Afghan National Army in command of security is not realistic. Considering the quick disappearance of the state structure at a district level, it is difficult to envision a strong army standing alone without any other state institutions around. Like it or not, the Taliban are a long-term part of the Afghan political landscape, and we need to try and negotiate with them in order to reach a diplomatic settlement. The Taliban’s leadership has indicated its willingness to negotiate, and it is in our interests to talk to them. In fact, the Taliban are primarily concerned about the future of Afghanistan and not – contrary to what some may think -- a broader global Islamic jihad. Their links with Al-Qaeda – which is not, in any case, in Afghanistan any more -- are weak. We need to at least try to seriously explore the possibility of a political settlement in which the Taliban are part of the Afghan political system. The negotiations with the insurgents could be extended to all groups in Afghanistan and regional powers.
The current contacts between the Karzai government and the Taliban are not enough. The United States must take the initiative to start negotiations with the insurgents and frame the discussion in such a way that American security interests are taken into account. In addition, from the point of view of Afghanistan’s most vulnerable populations – women and ethnic minorities, for instance – as well as with respect to the limited but real gains made since 2001, it is better to negotiate now rather than later, since the Taliban will likely be stronger next year. This is why we ask you to sanction and support a direct dialogue and negotiation with the Afghan Taliban leadership residing in Pakistan. A ceasefire and the return of the insurgency leadership in Afghanistan could be part of a de-escalation process leading to a coalition government. Without any chance for a military victory, the current policy will put the United States in a very difficult position.
For a process of political negotiation to have a chance of addressing the significant core grievances and political inequalities it must occur on multiple levels – among the countries that neighbour Afghanistan as well as down to the provincial and sub-district. These various tables around which negotiations need to be held are important to reinforce the message -- and the reality -- that discussions about Afghanistan’s political future must include all parties and not just be a quick-fix deal with members of the insurgency.
We believe that mediation can help achieve a settlement which brings peace to Afghanistan, enables the Taliban to become a responsible actor in the Afghan political order, ensures that Afghanistan cannot be used as a base for international terrorism, protects the Afghan people’s hard-won freedoms, helps stabilize the region, renders the large scale presence of international troops in Afghanistan unnecessary and provides the basis of an enduring relationship between Afghanistan and the international community. All the political and diplomatic ingenuity that the United States can muster will be required to achieve this positive outcome. It is time to implement an alternative strategy that would allow the United States to exit Afghanistan while safeguarding its legitimate security interests.
Respectfully,


Mariam Abou Zahab
Researcher and humanitarian aid worker in Afghanistan in the 1980s-early 1990s

Matthieu Aikins
Journalist

Gregg Albo
Political Science Faculty, York University, Toronto, Canada

Scott Atran
Anthropologist (University of Michigan) and author of Talking to the Enemy

Bayram Balci
Researcher in CNRS and former Director of Institut Français d’Etudes sur l'Asie Centrale, IFEAC

Scott Bohlinger
Political and Security Analyst

Rony Brauman
Former head of Médecins Sans Frontières

Colonel (retired) Rene Cagnat
Scholar on Central Asia (IRIS)

Rupert Talbot Chetwynd
Author of Yesterday’s Enemy - Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?

Carlo Cristofori
Secretary, International Committee for Solidarity with the Afghan Resistance(established 1980)

Michael Cohen
Senior Fellow, American Security Project

Robert Crews
Associate Professor, Dept of History, Stanford University and co-editor of The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan

Robert Abdul Hayy Darr
Author of The Spy of the Heart and humanitarian aid worker in Afghanistan during the 1980s and early 1990s.

Rob Densmore
US Navy Afghanistan veteran and journalist

Gilles Dorronsoro
Visiting Scholar (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) and author of Revolution Unending

Bernard Dupaigne
Professor, Musée de l’Homme, Paris; author of several books about Afghanistan; humanitarian aid worker in Afghanistan, 1980-2010.

David B. Edwards
Anthropologist (Williams College) and author of Before Taliban

Jason Elliot
Author of An Unexpected Light

Christine Fair
Assistant Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University

Nick Fielding
Journalist and writer

Bernard Finel
Associate Professor of National Security Strategy, National War College (USA)

Joshua Foust
Military analyst and author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net

Martin Gerner
Journalist, author and filmmaker (Generation Kunduz: the war of the others)

Antonio Giustozzi
Author of Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop and editor of Decoding the New Taliban

Ali Gohar
Freelance consultant, Just Peace International

Edward Grazda
Photographer, author of Afghanistan 1980-1989 and Afghanistan Diary 1992-2000

Prof. Dr. Eva Gross
Senior Research Fellow, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit (Brussels)

Shah Mahmoud Hanifi
Associate Professor, James Madison University

Emilie Jelinek
Senior Researcher, The Liaison Office (TLO), Afghanistan

Muhammad Ajmal Khan Karimi
Kabul-based freelance journalist and research analyst

Jerome Klassen
Visiting Research Fellow, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (USA)

Daniel Korski
Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations

Felix Kuehn
Kandahar-based writer/researcher, co-editor of My Life With the Taliban

Musa Khan Jalalzai
Analyst and author of Taliban and Post-Taliban Afghanistan

Minna Jarvenpaa
Former Head of Analysis and Policy Planning, UNAMA

Colonel Robert C. Jones
U.S. Army Special Forces (Ret.), Director of Strategic Understanding, Center for Advanced Defense Studies (USA)

Dr. Leonard Lewisohn
Senior Lecturer in Persian, University of Exeter (UK)

Anatol Lieven
Professor, War Studies Department of King’s College London and author of Pakistan: A Hard Country

Charles Lindholm
Anthropologist, Boston University, and author of Generosity and Jealousy

Bob McKerrow
Author of Mountains of our Minds – Afghanistan

Shaheryar Mirza
Reporter for ‘Express 24/7’ (Pakistan)

Nick Miszak
Sociologist, Senior Research Officer, TLO, Kabul

Alessandro Monsutti
Research Director, Transnational Studies/Development Studies at The Graduate Institute, Geneva

Janan Mosazai
Kabul-based Freelance Journalist

Naheed Mustafa
Freelance Journalist

Jean Pfeiffer
Japan Assistant to ACAF

Gareth Porter
Journalist

Ahmed Rashid
Journalist and author of Taliban and Descent into Chaos

Amandine Roche
Afghanistan consultant and author of The Flight of the Afghan Doves

Nir Rosen
Fellow, New York University Center on Law and Security, and author of Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World

Gerard Russell
Research Fellow, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University

Prof. Justin Rudelson
Senior Lecturer, Asian and Middle Eastern Languages and Literatures, Dartmouth College and author of Lonely Planet Central Asia Phrasebook and Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China’s Silk Road

Lisa Schirch
Consultant and Professor of Peacebuilding, Center for Justice & Peacebuilding, Eastern Mennonite University (USA)

Emrys Schoemaker
Consultant and media advisor

Abdulkader H. Sinno
Associate Professor, Indiana University and author of Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond

Alex Strick van Linschoten
Kandahar-based writer/researcher, co-editor of My Life With the Taliban

Astri Surkhe
Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway

Yama Torabi
Co-Director, Integrity Watch Afghanistan

Matt Waldman
Afghanistan Analyst

Mosharraf Zaidi
Independent Analyst & Columnist for The News

[Demon of Undoing]

Way worse than Abu Gharib. There , you could almost get away with saying it was just a bad few ( not bad decisions), if nothing else because of limited opportunity. Not many Americans run prisons. Now , anybody with rattle is going to be fighting uphill to prove they aren't taking ears. It for sure will cost American lives.

Anybody want to float a G3 proposal for orderly withdrawal ? I think we're done there.

[Mr. Perfect]

skyhook-Az-berzer,

reaction from left?

Quiet as a mouse peeing on cotton.

[skyhook77sfg]

SPEAKING OF NCO WISDOM

LISTEN TO A MAN WHO WAS THERE

COMMENT FROM OUTSIDE THE WIRE

BUT INSIDE THE LOOP



In late 2001 American Special Forces, American air power and the functional portion (SAD,the direct action boys) of the CIA orchestrated a campaign which delivered a serious beating to the Taliban and al Qaeda. By December 2001 the worthless mandarins of the CIA had realized that they were missing out of the glory and started arriving in Afghanistan in great numbers where they pulled rank and sidelined the gunfighters. The Big Army too suddenly realized that things were going much better then predicted so senior staff officers by the plane load arrived to micro-manage the SF teams in the field explicitly preventing them from closing with and killing Osama Bin Laden. The men on the ground wanted to finish the mission; the men in the rear wanted to avoid mistakes which might adversely affect their careers. The result is that thousands of young boys who were in elementary school at the time from Canada to Australia, Britain to American, Estonia to Poland would grow up to fight and die or become crippled for life battling a resurgent Taliban.

NOT ONE of the senior officials who let Bin Laden get away would ever be held to account. We didn’t finish the war in 2001 due to inexplicable moral cowardice on the part of senior bureaucrats who jumped in the claim the glory of their subordinates. That same lack of accountability on the part of our political class and their handmaidens in the MSM has resulted in our country heading down the slippery slope of financial insolvency.

I have a dream that someday the people who feast off our tax money; who have steered us into financial insolvency, who start our wars but don’t finish them, exhibit the morale courage required to fix what they have broken. I know my hopes of seeing a leader who can do that rise to national prominence and then take on the sisyphean task of righting the ship of state are certain to be dashed. But a man can dream.



OBSERVANT ENOUGH TO KNOW THERE'S NO DIFFERENTIATING

BETWEEN SIAMEESE TWIN REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT APPARATCHIKS

ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES SUCH AS WAR VS PEACE OR CENTRAL PLANNED PAPER MONEY OR FREE ENETERPRISE REAL MONEY

ONLY EYEWASH SOCIAL ISSUES LIKE GAY MARRIAGE TO DIVIDE AND CONQUER AND PERPETUATE UNION OF CORPORATE AND GOVT POWER....

FASCISM LITE .... THE DIGITALLY ENHACED POTEMKIN FACADE OF DEMOCRACY WHERE CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE....

[AzariLoveIran]

[AzariLoveIran]

[AzariLoveIran]

[skyhook77sfg]

wanna know why there's no end in sight in the Stan?

amateurs dont listen to the pros....




COIN is a badly flawed instrument of statecraft: Why?

- The locals ultimately own the country being fought over. If they do not want the “reforms” you desire, they will resist you as we have been resisted in Iraq and Afghanistan. McChrystal’s strategy paper severely criticized Karzai’s government. Will that disapproval harden into a decision to act to find a better government or will we simply undercut Afghan central government and become the actual government?

- Such COIN wars are expensive, long drawn out affairs that are deeply debilitating for the foreign counterinsurgent power. Reserves of money, soldiers and national will are not endless. Ultimately, the body politic of the counterinsurgent foreign power turns against the war and then all that has occurred has been a waste.

- COIN theory is predicated on the ability of the counterinsurgents to change the mentality of the “protected” (read controlled) population. The sad truth is that most people do not want to be deprived of their ancestral ways and will fight to protect them. “Hearts and Minds” is an empty propagandist’s phrase.

- In the end the foreign counterinsurgent is embarked on a war that is not his own war. For him, the COIN war will always be a limited war, fought for a limited time with limited resources. For the insurgent, the war is total war. They have no where to escape to after a tour of duty. The psychological difference is massive.

- For the counterinsurgent the commitment of forces must necessarily be much larger than for the insurgents. The counterinsurgent seeks to protect massive areas, hundreds of built up areas and millions of people. The insurgent can pick his targets. The difference in force requirements is crippling to the counterinsurgents.

What should we do?

- Hold the cities as bases to prevent a recognized Taliban government until some satisfactory (to us) deal is made among the Afghans.

- Participate in international economic development projects for Afghanistan.

- Conduct effective clandestine HUMINT out of the city bases against international jihadi elements.

- Turn the tribes against the jihadi elements.

- Continue to hunt and kill/capture dangerous jihadis,

How long might you have to follow this program? It might be a long time but that would be sustainable. A full-blown COIN campaign in Afghanistan is not politically sustainable.

Col. ret.

Us Army Special Forces

[Sparky]

Broadly correct, but of course they do have somewhere to retreat to after a tour of duty. NWFP - Pakistan. A line that cannot be crossed, save by drones, "aerial hot pursuit" notwithstanding.

What should be done? Depart. Within a year they will be fighting amongst themselves again over what their Zubair from the village over the mountain said about our Aisha with equal vehemence and fury they now direct against the Yanquis.

[Mr. Perfect]

[skyhook77sfg]

only to be read by elephantiasistic americans....


A massive protest organized against the new war in Libya failed to materialize as planned yesterday.

Thousands of Code Pink members, Daily Kos readers and other assorted peace, love & granola type hippies descended upon Washington DC in tour buses financed by George Soros to march upon the White House with signs saying "No Blood For Oil" and other cliche' slogans.

Upon their arrival on Pennsylvania Ave. they were approached by a patrolman from the Washington DC Police Department and advised George Bush was no longer in office.

Upon being informed of this fact they decided instead to have a Venti decaf chai latte at Starbucks and go home.

[CgDs]

[skyhook77sfg]

SPARKY


THERE IS NO BORDER....

NOT IN THE MINDS

OF THE PASHTUNS

WHO LIVE ON BOTH SIDES



its just the gin soaked ex nihilo creation of the english raj ...



Karzai insists Pakistan increase security and stop incursions by Taliban insurgents into his country, even though the Afghan leader refuses to recognize the disputed common border, which divides tribes of the Pashtun ethnic group on either side of the frontier. As the tribal lands continue to serve as a training base for terrorists and the Taliban, deploying Pakistani troops into the region has harmed efforts to integrate the tribal areas into Pakistan. Bill Roggio, a U.S. veteran who has written from Iraq and Afghanistan, says the uncertainty over how to handle the tribal lands “makes the problems in Iraq look like a picnic.”
The Pakistani Tribal Areas

The semi-autonomous tribal lands consist of seven parts called “agencies”: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan. There are also six smaller zones known as frontier regions in the transitional area between the tribal lands and the North-West Frontier Province to the east. The harsh, mountainous territory of the tribal lands runs along the Afghanistan border, drawn during colonial times by British diplomat Sir Henry Mortimer Durand as a means to divide and weaken the eleven major Pashtun tribes and turn Afghanistan into a buffer zone between the British and Russian empires. To the south of the tribal lands lies the large province of Balochistan. It is also divided by the border known as the Durand Line, which has never been recognized by Afghanistan ....

http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-t ... eas/p11973



The Durand Line was demarcated by the British and signed into a treaty in 1893 with the Afghan ruler Amir Abdur Rehman Khan. The treaty was to stay in force for a 100-year period. According to Afrasiab Khattak, a political analyst, the areas from the Khayber Agency Northwards to Chitral, however, remained un-demarcated.

This disputed land was legally to be returned to Afghanistan in 1993 after the 100 year old Durand Treaty expired, similar to how Hong Kong was returned to China. Kabul has refused to renew the Durand Line treaty since 1993 when it expired, Throughout the last nine years, Pakistan has tried to get Afghan Warlords and Taliban to sign a renewal contract of the Treaty, and thankfully they didn’t not fall for the treachery of Pakistan. One of the reasons Pakistan faced problems with the Kabul rulers right from its inception was Kabul's claim over the North West frontier Province. (NWFP) Kabul never accepted that line or the fact that the NWFP is part of Pakistan. This was one of the main policy planks used by President Daoud Khan's government when it tried to foment trouble by Pashtoons nationalists in the NWFP on the issue of greater Pashtoonistan.

Until this day, the disputed land which rightfully and legally belongs to Afghanistan, is still recognized as the North-West Frontier Province, NWFP. Every other province in Pakistan is named by the ethnic group that resides there, such as Punjab, Sindh, and Balouchistan. But the ethnic Afghans that are forced under the sovereignty of Pakistan must accept the degrading and purposely named NWFP.

http://www.afghanistans.com/information ... ndline.htm




AS TO ONLY DRONES CROSS THE LINE...

the guys who do x border ops...

the anytime anywhere

we were never there guys

thank you very much.

[Sparky]

I'm well aware of that, Captain Hook - but the border is real enough to our chaps, in a N Vietnam / S Vietnam sort of a way. My point is, for Terry Taliban there is the front, and there is the comparative safety of across the border.

[skyhook77sfg]

well than with those modifications agreed upon we are now relatively on the same frequency...

imagine...

capt hook and peter pan blissfully walking off into the sunset hook in hand.

my cup runeth over.

[AzariLoveIran]

[AzariLoveIran]

[skyhook77sfg]

Goat grabbing contest held in Kabul


A group of Afghan men riding horses wait to play traditional game "Buzkashi" in Kabul, capital of Afghanistan on March 25, 2011. Buzkashi, which is translated as "goat grabbing", is a traditional Central Asian team sport played on horseback in Afghanistan. Players are skilled riders who can grab a goat or calf from the ground while riding a horse at full gallop. The goal of a player is to grab the carcass of a headless goat or calf and then get it clear of the other players and pitch it across a goal line or into a target circle or vat. (Xinhua/Ahmad Massoud)

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/p ... 799323.htm



THE OTHER GOAT EVENT IS CURRERNTLY IN ITS TENTH YEAR

WORLD RECORD GOAt ####.....

"U.S. Number One" chant anyone?

[skyhook77sfg]

Taliban abduct 50 policemen in Afghanistan
Monday March 28, 2011 (1137 PST)



ASADABAD: Taliban abducted around 50 off-duty Afghan policemen in an ambush in northeastern Afghanistan, the group and provincial officials said on Sunday.
Taliban-led militants have stepped up their fight this year against the Afghan government and its Western backers at a time when Kabul has announced security responsibilities for seven areas will be handed to Afghan forces in July. The policemen were abducted by militants in the Chapa Dara district of remote northeastern Kunar province after returning from neighbouring Nuristan province where they had travelled to collect their salaries, Nuristan Governor Jamaluddin Badr said. “The policemen were in civilian clothes and had no weapons with them,” Badr told journalists from Nuristan.

Mohammad Farooq, a senior police officer in Nuristan, confirmed around 50 policemen had been kidnapped by terrorists.

In an email statement sent to media, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the Islamist group was holding 50 policemen and the group’s military council for the area would decide their fate.

Kunar and Nuristan are remote and mountainous provinces that share a porous border with lawless areas of neighbouring Pakistan, where terrorists are said to have safe havens from which they launch attacks into Afghanistan.

http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?237627" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

IF BIN LADEN IS ALIVE HE IS IN THIS PART OF THE KUSH

[AzariLoveIran]

.

77sfg ,

Was Vietnam war about communism ?

Were Vietcong communist tugs ?

No

Vietnam war was about French wanting to keep Indochina colonies and America falling into the shit-pit

Vietcong fighters were fighting for motherland, they noble patriots

Afghanistan war is not about Islam

Afghan war now morphed into war of occupation, colonialism, defeat the population to install a western crony system and regime to ensure that pipeline from Central Asia to Indian Ocean

Too late for this kind stunt

Too late

Regent pregnant with lots of unintended consequences


.

[skyhook77sfg]

unfortunately you are right when you say

"to ensure that pipeline from Central Asia to Indian Ocean"

and re vietnam the french defeat left a vacuum

in the primary heroin source at that time..,

and nature abhors a vacuum .

[AzariLoveIran]